"Let me tell you something Simon; people round here are kinda ignorant - ignorance breeds fear and fear breeds violence - so watch your ass."

Lawson relates this axiom to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In his latest article for Common Ground News Service, he articulates the ways in which ignorance, fear and violence play major roles in the way Israelis and Palestinians perceive each other. Lawson focuses specifically on how the second Intifada has exacerbated the levels of ignorance, fear and violence, especially among the younger generation of both Israeli and Palestinian societies:

Through many conversations I had with Israelis and Palestinians the relationship between ignorance and fear was brought sharply into focus.

I noticed a difference in attitudes to 'the other' expressed by both Palestinians and Israelis who had experienced adult life before the first Intifada and those who had been too young to remember much before then.

What was the difference? Most people over 40, had friends or business associates from the 'other side' before the Intifada.

They do not fear 'the other'; they know they share not just the common interests of humanity - but also much of their cultural heritage.

While older Israelis and Palestinians remember a time when they worked alongside, dined alongside, and maintained legitimate friendships with members of the "other side," those who grew up in the midst of the second Intifada are ignorant to what were once commonalities of life:

Young Israelis and Palestinians, through no fault of their own, have little knowledge of 'the other'. If they encounter each other at all it is across a check-point or during a military operation - situations that don't illuminate their common humanity, but re-enforce ignorance, prejudice and fear.

Violence between Israelis and Palestinians, Lawson argues, is a manifestation of the peoples' fears for their safety, security and survival. However, Lucy Nusseibeh and Shelley Ostroff argue in their article for Common Ground News Service, that there is another dimension of fear that permeates Israeli and Palestinian societies: a fear of a resolution of the conflict.

Nusseibeh and Ostroff's argument is one rooted in psychology and morality. They explain:

Israelis and Palestinians often view each other in stark, polarised terms of "we are good, they are bad". This is actually an expression of a mechanism we use to cope with fear whereby we project unwanted aspects of ourselves or our own group onto the other. Each side tends to attribute all the violence, inhumanity and injustice to the other, while claiming complete moral authority for itself. While this mechanism may help people feel better because it generates a sense of moral strength and clarity in the face of danger and confusion, it does not necessarily have any bearing on reality and therefore does not help alleviate the fear. In fact the opposite is true; it reinforces the fear by making the other side seem worse than it is.

Both Israelis and Palestinians see themselves as victims, albeit for different historical and current reasons. Regardless of the immense inequalities of power and control, there is little acknowledgement by either side of their roles as persecutors in the conflict.

The victim role is more complicated than it seems. While the focus might be on suffering, it also generates a profound sense of self-righteousness and a justification for excessive amounts of violence and inhumanity towards the other. Just think, how much violence is committed in the name of self-defence or security?

Sometimes, the need to preserve the sense of self-righteousness that comes with victimhood can be even more important than safety. This need has brought Israelis and Palestinians in different ways to provoke each other into intensifying the role of persecutor. The violence that is consequently provoked reinforces the "evidence" of the monstrous and inhumane nature of the enemy. When this happens we can see how the fear of violent conflict is often better tolerated than the fear of a loss of one's moral bearings and the resulting guilt and shame that arise from an acknowledgement that one is not only a victim but also a persecutor.

Ultimately, these processes can be linked to a generally unacknowledged fear of peace. Continuing conflict where one's own side is totally good and the other is all bad can be less frightening than the complex world that is offered by the prospect of peace with one's neighbour. War is often recognised as a way to unite a people in fear around a common enemy. It is also a way to protect people from having to face their own dual role as persecutors and victims, and all the moral ambiguity and painful internal personal conflict that implies.

Perhaps the prospect of peace also generates a fear of the unknown nature of the relationship that would develop within this new reality (although in different ways for the Israelis and the Palestinians), and the impact this might have on each side's identity.

Lawson, Nusseibeh and Ostroff all agree that fear, both of violence and of peace, needs to be mitigated in order to achieve a permanent resolution of the greater conflict.

Nusseibeh and Ostroff contend that:

For the fears to be overcome, it is important to take an eagle's-eye view and shift to a higher systemic perspective that acknowledges both Israelis and Palestinians as interdependent parts of a larger whole within which neither part can be eliminated, controlled or fully extricated from the other. Such a perspective would focus on how best to manage this relationship in its many dimensions and with real reciprocity. It would take the needs of all parties into account and would cultivate the well-being not only of both Israelis and Palestinians, but of the Israeli-Palestinian system as a whole.

Lawson also believes in creating an integrated society:  

I and some of my B.I. [Before Intifada] friends believe that the only viable solution will be one in which Muslims, Jews, Christians and others live together as equals, seeing each other as neighbours, acting on their commonalties and celebrating their differences.

The fears of the Israeli and Palestinian people must be addressed in order to see progress in the region.

Adopting the current fashion inaugurated by President Obama with his June 4 Cairo address, Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Mashal joined the list of political leaders delivering major policy speeches in the Middle East. On June 25, Mashal delivered a response to the speeches of Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu. His address presents Hamas' comprehensive, updated political approach, thus also deciding the internal debate within Hamas between the so-called moderates and the so-called radicals - in favor of the moderates.

On the face of it, the political principles presented by Mashal are not highly different from the formal PLO stances presented in negotiations with Israel since the start of the Oslo process. According to these principles, Hamas is prepared to accept a political solution that mandates a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital and with the right of return for Palestinian refugees.

At the same time, there are some major differences between the PLO's stances that have developed over the course of the negotiations and this approach. First, the PLO agrees that a political solution would represent the end of the conflict, whereas Hamas does not. Based on statements by Hamas representatives on other occasions, Hamas is apparently leaving the end of the conflict to coming generations. Second, during negotiations the Palestinians demonstrated some flexibility regarding the way certain principles would be implemented. Thus, for example, the Palestinians were prepared to accept a situation in which the border between Israel and the Palestinian state would be drawn on the basis of the 1967 lines with some limited and mutually accepted emendations. The significance is that settlement blocs near the 1967 borders would be annexed to Israel, and in return the Palestinians would receive the identical amount of Israeli territory as part of a land swap. The argument was primarily over the size of the settlement blocs, with the Palestinians urging that they be as small as possible. With regard to the refugee question, despite the fact that the negotiators never formally ceded the right of return, they were prepared to examine practical solutions that assumed that the vast majority of Palestinians would not return to Israel. This apparently is what lies behind the expression "an agreed upon solution to the refuge problem" in the Arab peace initiative. For his part, Mashal refused to accept any bending of this Palestinian condition. He also expressed opposition to a demilitarized Palestinian state, presented by Netanyahu as one of Israel's main demands; the PLO negotiators were prepared to accept limitation on the arming of the future Palestinian state. On another point emphasized by Netanyahu, Mashal embraced the general Palestinian opposition to recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, and characterized the demand as racist. Furthermore, Mashal did not concede the violent struggle as a legitimate means of attaining the objectives of the Palestinian people.

In recent years, since Hamas became an active player in the internal Palestinian political arena, these guidelines have been uttered many times by different Hamas leaders presenting the idea of a hudna, a long term ceasefire, but they were understood as belonging to Hamas' moderate wing, which is engaged in a dispute with the more radical one. It was also always commonly assumed that the more moderate stance was for external consumption only, and that therefore it emerged in meetings with foreigners and in interviews with Western media. Yet now, for the first time, Mashal presented this position as Hamas' official stance, and did so in Arabic for the Arab public. It is hard to imagine that he did this without authorization from the Shura, Hamas' highest authority. Mashal's speech also reveals that the supposed split between Damascus-based radicals and Gaza Strip-based moderates is a false distinction. There are apparently moderates and radicals in both places, and Mashal himself is not necessarily aligned with the radicals. More important, Hamas has an orderly process of decision making, even if it is slow and based on consensus building. The consensus that has formed in Hamas in recent years centers on the positions presented by Mashal in his speech.

Most significantly, Hamas is willing to accept a process of negotiations with Israel, as it was when it endorsed the Palestinian prisoners' document (officially the National Reconciliation Document) and the understandings that prompted the establishment of a national unity government in early 2007. Of course, it is difficult to renew negotiations for a permanent settlement while ignoring all that has happened since they started. On the other hand, Hamas' positions allow a certain amount of flexibility to discuss partial agreements that would not obligate Hamas to accept the end of the conflict, and would also allow Israel side to postpone decisions about sensitive issues.

Mashal's speech was intended to help Hamas in its internal rivalry with the Palestinian Authority, headed by Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad, and also to take advantage of Obama's speech to gain international legitimacy for Hamas and launch a dialogue with the United States and other Western nations. In the internal arena, the speech presents Hamas to the Palestinian people as an entity willing to engage in the political process but loyal to the national stances of the PLO, while Abbas and his associates have betrayed them. The speech, which included the usual attacks on the PA and its denunciation as an Israeli collaborator, also attacked the PA's joint work with General Dayton's security team. Apparently the success in building the Palestinian security forces on the West Bank, assisted by Dayton's delegation, is of great concern to Hamas. With regard to Western nations, the purpose of the speech was to convince the West that Hamas is a partner for dialogue. The speech will make it easier for elements in Western Europe and within Obama's administration that support dialogue with Hamas to advance their position.

At the same time, under Egypt's aegis and with its mediation, there are negotiations underway between Hamas and the PA over an arrangement for reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. The three parties involved have for now abandoned the notion of a comprehensive "national reconciliation" between Hamas and the PLO/Fatah, and are discussing the possibility of establishing a joint committee to administer the Gaza Strip and allow regional and internal institutions to deliver the promised assistance for rebuilding the area. Such an arrangement would also allow agreement with Israel over opening the crossings to the Gaza Strip, and would possibly also help in attaining an agreement on the release of prisoners that would return Gilad Shalit. The target date set by Egypt for reaching an agreement is July 7, but at this point the sides are far from success. If the two sides do arrive at an agreement, it would greatly affect the approach of the international community on dialogue with Hamas, and would weaken the demand that Hamas meet the three preconditions set down by the Quartet: recognizing Israel, abandoning the use of violence, and accepting existing agreements.

This column is re-published with the permission of the Institute for National Security Studies.

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James Besser in The Jewish Week questioned different Middle East experts and scholars to discuss the changes that may occur in government due to Netanyahu's political shift towards the left:

With his back to the wall in his dealings with Washington, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is reportedly weighing the possibility of broadening his government to give him more flexibility in anticipation of meeting American demands.

The reports are based in part on right-wing elements in Netanyahu's coalition government that are upset with the prime minister's decision to work towards a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, according to Yossi Alpher, an Israeli analyst and co-editor of the Israeli-Palestinian Web site bitterlemons.org.

Possible Coalition with Kadima:

"...There are members of the opposition centrist Kadima Party led by Shaul Mofaz, the former defense minister, who are "lobbying Kadima to join the government now that Netanyahu has accepted a two-state solution." [Yossi Alpher]

But Alpher said that because Tzipi Livni, former foreign minister and Kadima Party chair, is not anxious to join the coalition, Mofaz "might take some members with him and move to Likud." Alpher noted that a proposed law in Israel would make it easier for him to do that.

He hastened to add that he does not foresee anyone "leaving the coalition to make room for Kadima, and I don't believe Kadima would reopen discussions about joining the coalition."

Judith Kipper, director of Middle East Programs for the Institute of World Affairs, said a Likud-Kadima coalition "may be what Netanyahu would like to do, but I think Kadima would have a very hard time [joining] such a coalition as long as Lieberman remains part of it."This leak, combined with reports that Netanyahu is considering broadening his right-leaning government, suggests that "Netanyahu is leaving the door open for a shakeup," according to .

He [Gerald Steinberg, a political science professor at Bar-Ilan University] said Netanyahu might opt to broaden his government whether or not the U.S. and Israel reach an agreement on Israeli-Palestinian peace issues. Steinberg said Israel might have to "move to the left" to reach an accord with the U.S., or form a national unity government to withstand American pressure if the two sides failed to agree.

Settlement Issue:

Word of a possible government shakeup came as Defense Minister Ehud Barak arrived in Washington Tuesday for talks aimed at easing U.S. pressure for a total settlement freeze that includes "natural growth," and amid growing speculation about what comes next for an administration that has committed itself to rapid progress in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.

According to reports, the Netanyahu government is proposing a three-to six-month halt in settlement building, coupled with confidence-building gestures by Arab nations and the Palestinians.

While most analysts here predict continuing U.S. efforts to improve the environment for negotiations by pressing Israel on settlements and the Palestinians on security and an end to incitement, there is a widespread expectation that sweeping new U.S. initiatives are unlikely.

Edward Walker, a former State Department official and ambassador to Israel, said the Netanyahu government will try to work with the administration here on issues like "reducing the number of checkpoints, opening up more cities to the Palestinian security forces and finding some way to agree on settlements. I'm certain the administration does not want to wind up in a shooting match with the Israeli government, especially since Bibi has responded to some of their concerns."

Returning to Negotiations with Fatah:

Stephen Cohen, a national scholar of the Israel Policy Forum who recently met with Palestinian officials, said "this is a very active time" in terms of discussions about how to move the peace process forward.

He pointed out that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was not responsive to Ehud Olmert's offer of more than 93 percent of Palestinian territories, in negotiations last year, in part because Fatah "hadn't resolved internal problems" with Hamas.

Cohen said Abbas has dealt with the problem by bypassing Hamas and winning support from the Egyptians and Saudis, suggesting that Abbas may be more flexible in future talks.

Olmert's Peace Proposal and Reactions:

Olmert had proposed placing Jerusalem's Holy Basin - the areas containing the Old City and surrounding holy sites - under Divine sovereignty and having it administered by a consortium of Saudis, Jordanians, Americans, Israelis and Palestinians.

In addition, he proposed offering the Palestinians 93.5 to 93.7 percent of the Palestinian territories, along with a land swap of 5.8 percent and safe passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. And the Palestinian refugee issue would be resolved by permitting a small number of Palestinians into Israel as a "humanitarian gesture."

After Olmert revealed his offer last month, Livni said through a spokesman that she disapproved of the offer. And although Abbas said he would like peace talks to resume from where they left off, Cohen said the Palestinians do not expect it to be offered by Netanyahu.