Israel Palestine Blogs

THE DEBATE over whether or not to engage Syria is once again center stage this week as a Syrian delegation visits Washington for talks with American officials and academics. Syria's enthusiasm for engaging the next American administration offers the incoming president an opportunity to influence Syrian behavior. The next president would be ill advised to aim this silver bullet on an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty unlikely to be realized. Instead, the United States should aim at getting Syria to end its meddling in neighboring Lebanon and its support for Hezbollah militants.

President Bashar al-Assad is already positioning Syria toward a new administration. American forces have confirmed his cooperation along the Syria-Iraq border, and he is now engaging in indirect negotiations with Israel. He appears to be temporarily moderating his country's negative intervention in Lebanon's internal processes.

Engaging the United States inevitably risks new tension between Damascus and Tehran even without an American precondition of severing relations with Iran. Yet the Syrians seem eager to engage. While such engagement clearly offers mutual gains, it raises the question: What should America ask from Syria in their negotiations?

Many policy analysts argue that the "low-hanging fruit" is an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty. They recommend requiring Syria to actively pursue a peace treaty with Israel in return for full US engagement and resumption of full diplomatic relations. This strategy makes sense: a historic peace between Israel and Syria will significantly reduce the risk of a regional conflict and will destabilize the functions of Palestinian resistance movements headquartered in Damascus.

However, a look at the political dynamics in Israel reveals that such an agreement would not be imminent. The Israeli Parliament is considering a law that will require the government to bring any agreement pertaining to a withdrawal from the Golan Heights to a national referendum.

The issue of relinquishing the Golan Heights encounters three significant barriers. The first is a strong grass-roots lobby on behalf of Israel maintaining the Golan. The second is a lack of urgency in the Israeli public to resolve this dispute due to the absence of an occupied population in this area - significantly different from the approach to the West Bank. The third, and perhaps most important, is that the Israeli public views a withdrawal from the Golan as a significant security risk. Ingredients, no doubt, for nonagreement.

The Israeli prime minister, realizing he cannot pass a treaty in a national referendum, may avoid completing the negotiations - similar to Prime Minister Ehud Barak in 1999. Worse, there could be a treaty that fails to be ratified by the Israeli public. Either way, Syria will be able to circumvent blame, while gaining full relations with the United States.

Taking a broader look at Syrian interests might offer better opportunities for the United States. Syrian leaders have other items of higher priority on their agenda before a peace agreement with Israel. More important for them is regaining their dominance over Lebanon and breaking out of their international isolation through full engagement with the United States.

The United States should approach Assad with a different formula: Syria must choose between its top priorities. If Assad wants to pursue domination over Lebanon and his support for Hezbollah, he should find no friend in Washington. However, if he wants to engage the United States, he would need to end the weapons flow to Hezbollah, demarcate his borders with Lebanon, and establish full diplomatic relations with it - treating it as a fully sovereign state.

Negotiations will not be easy. The Syrians are not eager to "give up" their attempts at domination over Lebanon. But using the leverage of a US-Syrian relationship is the best way to achieve this American interest.

At the same time, the United States should make clear to both Syria and Israel that it will support negotiations and a peace treaty between the two countries. America should even be willing to back an agreement with resources and guarantees, if needed. But it must be made clear that negotiations and a resulting agreement are for Syria and Israel to pursue.

Michael Bergman is a Middle East analyst.

Can Lebanon's March 14 Reverse the Tide?
By David Schenker
July 23, 2008

This week, Lebanon's new national unity government is slated to announce its ministerial statement (bayan waziri), the policy document that will define Beirut's working parameters and agenda through the spring 2009 elections. For the pro-West majority March 14 coalition, the priority will be to incorporate into the statement a reference to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which prohibits weapons movement to Hizballah and expands government sovereignty throughout Lebanon. Hizballah, for its part, will look to maintain the legitimacy of "the resistance." Although March 14 still maintains a government majority, three years of hostility and self-inflicted wounds have left the ruling party dramatically weakened, making it unclear whether the coalition will be able to prevent Hizballah from consolidating further political gains…..

Relations with Syria
Another focus of the negotiations is the future disposition of Lebanese-Syrian relations. March 14 leaders state that that they seek "good relations between Syria and Lebanon as two independent countries." In the aftermath of Kuntar's release, March 14 officials have also argued that the statement should refer to the Lebanese "missing" who are presumed to be in Syria. According to Support of Lebanese in Detention and Exile (SOLIDE), 643 Lebanese have been imprisoned by Damascus since the 1970s. The Lebanese parliamentary committee charged with investigating these detainees believes ninety-one remain alive.

National Dialogue — Again?
Reports this week suggest that the new ministerial statement could be released as early as today. Yesterday, however, Lebanese press reports pointed to snags in the talks over bilateral relations with Syria and the weapons of the "resistance." If March 14 and the Hizballah-led opposition do not find acceptable language in the coming days, the most contentious issues will be referred to a national dialogue chaired by President Suleiman. Given the precedent of ineffective Lebanese national dialogues, this "solution" promises to be a prescription for deferred conflict (see PolicyWatch #1089).

Regardless of the outcome of the ministerial statement, it will constitute at best only a temporary ceasefire in the battle between the March 14 coalition and the opposition. While the compromise nature of the document will ensure that no party is entirely satisfied, it will also leave critical questions about Lebanon's future unresolved. No doubt, many Lebanese will breathe a sigh of relief when the statement is published, and start to look forward to the parliamentary elections — and a new government — next spring. But given developments of recent months, a weak statement will offer little comfort for March 14 and its constituent groups. Instead of providing a respite, these groups will likely focus on preparing — arming and training — for the inevitable next round with Hizballah.

David Schenker is director of the Program on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute.