Doron Zahavi, pixellated (Eli Attias)

Doron Zahavi, who still can be called only “Captain George” in the Israeli media, has gone public with his grievance against the IDF, which employed him to torture kidnapped Arabs who were thought to have intelligence about affairs in Lebanon or Syria, specifically Israeli prisoners of war. Among those he worked his wonders on was Mustafa Dirani, who was thought to have specific knowledge of the whereabouts of Ron Arad. Yossi Gurvitz reports ( in Hebrew) that Zahavi ordered one of his subordinates to undress and rape Dirani. Another Zahavi subordinate, who blew the whistle on the whole military torture complex he ran, says his commander sodomized Dirani with a nightstick.

The brave torturer has the effrontery to claim that the anal lacerations Dirani suffered were due to “constipation,” for which they gave him a laxative that caused him to soil himself.  The victim says he was forced to wear a diaper constantly even when it contained excrement.  And such treatment, as Gurvitz confirms and as I’ve reported here previously is SOP for the Israeli torture apparatus.

There are those who applaud the Israeli Supreme Court for outlawing torture in a landmark ruling.  But unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Israeli rulings appear to be only advisory and not declarative.  The security apparatus feels emboldened to act as it wishes, court ruling or no.  That’s why IDF Gen. Yair Naveh ordered Palestinian militants murdered in cold blood though they were unarmed, in direct violation of a Supreme Court ruling.  Note, that the brave justices, when offered an opportunity to review Naveh’s brazen violation of their ruling, refused to do so, in characteristically timid fashion.

Israeli prison guard offering Mustafa Dirani a hearty 'a votre sante' on his release from prison (Life)

Gurvitz notes that, like the CIA tapes of waterboarding of Al Qaeda suspects which were erased, the Dirani interrogation tapes mysteriously disappeared.  They must’ve thought where there’s no smoke there can be no fire.  If the tapes had survived the fire might have burned not just Zahavi and his boss, but a very senior IDF commander, Amos Gilad.  That’s pretty high up the food chain.  Zahavi claims Gilad was watching the interrogations in real-time.

Despite the destruction of key evidence, the IDF didn’t bargain for a disgruntled subordinate stricken by conscience for the horrible things he did there, would spill the beans and expose the whole sordid mess publicly.  That whistleblower himself has been threatened with state prosecution for perpetrating some of the alleged crimes of which he charges Zahavi.  The Israeli motto seems to be: let no good deed go unpunished.

On the strength of this claim and the notoriety that derived from it, Zahavi’s notorious Unit 504 was disbanded (only to re-emerge in recent months in all its former glory), Dirani was freed, and the IDF officer was cashiered. Though he resurfaced as the Israeli police’s chief anti-Arab enforcer for East Jerusalem. He has the title of “liaison” to the Palestinian community. But Jouad Siam knows first hand what that means. Zahavi threatened to destroy the home of the Silwan activist and to destroy the community organization he founded if he refused to inform on his fellow Palestinians.

Dirani is now suing the Israeli government for the abuse he suffered and the Israeli Supreme Court ruled the trial may go forward. Zahavi too is suing the government because it didn’t give him a medal for the dirty work he did on its behalf. He wants a tidy sum in return for keeping his mouth shut. He even says he’d take a job in Alaska (I didn’t know there were any IDF outposts there or any torture victims for him to work on) if they’d at least treated him with the respect he deserved. This reminds me of a Martin Scorsese mafia pic in which the disaffected made-guy goes to the don and whines about being cut out of the spoils and not getting what he has coming to him. Usually the guy is offed in the next reel, though I’m not sure the IDF has gotten to the point where it gets rid of its own rotten apples in that fashion.

Lest you doubt he is a rotten apple, take a peek at this:

“If this goes to court, what I told you today is just the teaser,” he threatens, “Trust me – no one really wants me to climb up to the stand. If I have to stand there and speak of Dirani, you’ll find out I have plenty more to say about how the apparatus acts when it needs to hide all sorts of things […] and everyone is a liar, which is why the country is where it is today, no deterrence, nothing. And in the end? I’m the apparatus’ scapegoat.”

If he doesn’t get the Israel Prize for torture he’s going to sing all day on the stand and tell the world how dirty the IDF and security apparatus is.  Now, this could be the disgruntled ravings of an extortionist who’s bluffing; or this guy has the goods and he’s willing to tell the world just how vile and dirty the entire Israeli security system is.  I’d say the truth is somewhere in between.  My guess is that while he does have plenty of dirt, that he’s more interested in upping the price for his silence than telling all the dirty little secrets.  He’s too much a company man and probably too much a blowhard and coward to really tell it all.  But that’s just a guess.

Gurvitz’s closing paragraph is poignant and compelling:

The Dirani-George case, had it been treated properly, may have become the 300 Line affair of the 504 unit. This did not happen, simply because the public does not wish to know. In 2012 Israel (as in 1994 Israel, as in 1984 Israel) the idea that every person – even Dirani, even George – is a human being, which must not be deprived by reducing him to quivering piece of meat, lying in its own excrement, is still a radical one.

I would only add that the only reason the 300 Line affair was exposed was that a senior IDF commander was accused of a crime he didn’t commit and while the entire government apparatus closed ranks behind the lying scumbag of a Shin Bet chief who perpetrated the coverup, the military officer wouldn’t go quietly.  Also, there were a few brave media outlets which defied censorship and reported the scandal.  In the Zahavi case there are no IDF sacrificial lambs, nor is there a brave media ready to defy the censor and spill the beans.  But Gurvitz’s main claim is correct: the Israeli public doesn’t give a crap about the suffering of an Arab.  Let Dirani rot in hell would be the prevailing wisdom.

I noticed something very peculiar about Yossi’s post when it was republished at 972 Magazine.  The link to my own post which exposed the name of Doron Zahavi, which Yossi graciously included in his own blog post, was gone once it was republished at 972.  It’s fairly easy to figure out why.  The 972 editor who republished made a judgement that merely by linking to my post they might bring the wrath of the Israeli security services on them.

Now, to be clear, it is not illegal (yet) in Israel to link to a foreign source which exposes the identity of an Israeli security officer.  In fact, Zahavi is no longer in the IDF and so isn’t even protected by the traditional proffer of anonymity offered to military and intelligence officers in the media.  But 972 figured self-censorship was the better part of valor.  It’s what I call pre-emptive self-censorship.  Linking to my blog may not be illegal yet, but let’s err on the side of caution and not give the security goons an excuse to go after us.  I understand the dangers faced by the dissenting media inside Israel.  But still, if they don’t have courage, who will?  So I think it was essentially a cowardly act.

Yossi’s act of linking to me was brave such principled blogging is why he’s been interrogated by the police for his blog.  As for 972?  Not so much.

If anyone has a photo of the real Captain George, please let me know.  He deserves to have his name and image up in lights.

Let’s add to this an only tangentially related matter that another 972 writer, Dimi Reider took a nasty potshot at me that was riddled with inaccuracies in his own 972 column.  When I asked Noam Sheizaf for the right of reply in a 972 post he never answered.  So much for progressive solidarity and fairness.

By Hooman Majd, Politico, January 17, 2012

Top five, 10 or 100 lists are standard at the end of the year. Though the Iranian year doesn’t end for roughly two months, given the escalating tensions between Washington and Tehran, with threats and counter threats over the Strait of Hormuz — to say nothing of most GOP presidential candidates’ views on what to do about Iran — it might be useful to compile one on the growing Iran crisis, early 2012 here and late 1390 there:

1) More severe sanctions will eventually cause the regime to blink.

Um, no. Thirty-plus years of sanctions have had no effect on Tehran. None. The regime can’t blink — even if it wanted to. Not after it has spent energy, money and every tool it has convincing its people that the nuclear program is a matter of national pride, that the West wants to prevent Iranians from enjoying the fruits of technological advancement and that their suffering under the sanctions is for the country’s greater good.

The regime’s credibility has already suffered because of the opposition protests in 2009 and 2010. So what would it have left if it caved to foreign demands that even the opposition describes as unreasonable?

2) Increasing sanctions will cause the Iranian people to hate the regime even more, leading to an uprising against the ayatollahs.

No. The Iranian people may blame their government for economic mismanagement, as well as human-rights abuses — but most won’t blame it for U.S. actions. Similarly, Iranians may blame President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for exacerbating domestic problems or creating problems with the West because of his rhetoric. But they don’t blame him for, say, sanctions that prevent Tehran from buying parts for its aging airplanes, which fall out of the sky with alarming frequency.

Think about it: When a nation is attacked, or under severe external pressure, it usually blames the external enemies, not its own leaders. If you factor in the assassinations of scientists on the streets of Tehran and mysterious factory explosions, sanctions and threats may make life miserable for Iranians but are unlikely to cause them to overthrow their rulers. (more…)

Students at the University of Pennsylvania are hosting this weekend the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) Movement’s National Convention. May I take this occasion to wish the speakers and organizers a good conference, with a healthy debate on issues surrounding BDS. This is a wonderful opportunity for the speakers to explain more about global BDS, a non-violent Palestinian movement that includes  Israeli Jews, non-Israeli Jews, and non-Jews.

I have written here and here about the global BDS movement. I have expressed solidarity with that movement, and I have argued that liberal Zionists should boycott the settlements and their products, and companies that make money off the Occupation.  But I do want to consider two  questions that have been raised in conjunction with the Penn conference.

Question One: Is the BDS movement anti-Israel?

Is the BDS movement anti-Israel? Jews are said to like answering questions with questions, and so I ask, “Was the BDS movement against apartheid anti-South African?” The answer to that question depends on whom you ask. For many whites and most Afrikaners, and the South African government at the time, the answer was a resounding yes.  For them, apartheid was an essential part of the South African regime. Dismantle apartheid, and the country, no matter what it’s name, would never be the same. Yet it was possible for those who opposed apartheid to contemplate a better place for all South Africans, blacks, whites, and colored. For them the BDS movement against apartheid was not anti-South African.

The global BDS movement today has adopted three tenets: a) “ending the occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling” the separation barrier; b) granting full civil rights and equality to the Arab minority within Israel, and c)  “respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194.  The three tenets correspond to the three main population sectors of the Palestinians. Since there is no tenet calling for the abolition of the State of Israel, or its transformation into one state, I conclude that supporters of BDS are as anti-Israel as supporters of BDS in South Africa were anti-South African. Both groups wanted to bring about fundamental changes in their respective societies. To be sure, there are differences; the Palestinians in the occupied territories and the Palestinian diaspora don’t view themselves as Israelis. But no  matter – what is at stake in these three tenets is not the existence of the State of Israel, but its compliance with international law and UN resolutions.

Question Two: Doesn’t BDS hurt Palestinians? 

The Palestinian economy is inextricably linked to the Israeli economy, and for good reason. Israel’s aim has always been to control the Palestinians economically and to use them as cheap labor (when possible) and as markets for their products. The Israelis  have done their best to prevent true economic Palestinian independence so as to thwart the possibility of real competition. But they have also been interested in improving the conditions of Palestinians in Areas A and B (not in Area C, where they are interested in restricting their development) on the reasonable ground that that is in Israel’s best interest – so that the Palestinians will have something to lose from fighting for the independence. And also because Israelis don’t have any particular animus against the Palestinians; they just want control of their land and resources.

From time immemorial, Imperialism has argued that empires bring civilization and economic prosperity to the natives, and that the latter is more important than freedom and independence. One of the most stunning examples of the imperialist mentality appeared a few days ago in the Daily Pennsylvanian by a Mr. Dov Hoch, the president of the Penn club in Israel.  In Mr. Hoch’s article, “Why We Should Invest and not Divest” , Mr. Hoch urged BDS supporters not to “burn your neighbor’s house despite the fact that you live in connected structures.” He did not explain why disinvestment in, say, Caterpillar, would cripple the Palestinian economy.

In fact, Mr. Hoch apparently knows nothing about the BDS movement, which targets companies that benefit from the Occupation. He also doesn’t know, or doesn’t wish to mention,  that the much praised (in the West) nation-builder, Palestinian Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad, supports the boycott of the settlement goods. From the perspective of the typified Anglo colony in Ra’anana, Mr. Hoch can urge Palestinian American Penn Students to

Come and live in the West Bank and Gaza, joining the 5000 Ivy League alumni living in Israel and the tens of thousands of U.S.-educated Americans who moved to Israel and contribute richly to the economy.

One of the speakers at the BDS conference is the Palestinian American Penn alumnus, Ahmed Moor. The last time I saw Ahmed, he was being tear-gassed at a protest at Bil’in. Perhaps Mr. Hoch, with his powerful contacts in the PA, can arrange for Ahmed to purchase a villa in Efrat. Or he can join former Yale professor, Mazin Qumsiyeh, in Walajeh, the village that Israel has turned into a ghetto.

Despite the mixture of genuine good will and condescension that typifies the enlightened colonialist, it would be wrong to dismiss Mr. Hoch or his point. For one thing, it is important to find serious investors in the Palestinian economy. For another, sanctions against Israel will hurt the Palestinians, and it will hurt them more than the Israelis.

In 1990, when the question of divestment from South African raged at MIT, a student wrote a letter to The Tech arguing against divestment:

Assume, for argument's sake, that MIT divestment did not result in a transfer of ownership but instead was an impetus for the disinvestment of the affected companies. Ignoring, for the moment, the effects on the US and world economy, what would happen in South Africa? Unfortunately, the black population would be the hardest hit. They would lose employment that offers them integrated facilities, equal pay for equal work, extensive training programs, housing assistance and education. Unlike their South African counterparts, American corporations address the single most important need for all South African blacks -- a quality education….

I should hasten to point out that this student was an opponent of apartheid. She simply felt that the tactic was too harsh and would hurt South African blacks. And, indeed, she had a good point. Factories closed, putting black people out of work.

And yet Nelson Mandela supported divestment. And while the role of the divestment campaign in the ultimate dismantling of apartheid has been debated, nobody questions that the international focus on South Africa ultimately helped lead to change.

I am not in favor of sanctions that will constitute severe collective punishment against Israeli public, just as I am not in favor of sanctions against the people of Iran,The Global BDS movement’s attempt to bring sanctions against a serial violator of human rights is of a different order altogether. But, as an Israeli, I am indeed prepare to suffer such sanctions if the price to pay for them is the end of the Occupation and Palestinian independence. Of course, I cannot speak to how much suffering Palestinians are willing to endure.  Were sanctions against Israel to bite, I am sure that Palestinians, being human, would disagree on these issues.

But what I would ask Mr. Hoch and others is – how much suffering are they willing to endure for the political and economic independence of Israel? In his article he advises BDS-ers to “throw out their IPhones – Apple just bought an Israeli company?”

Would he throw out his IPhone to end a sixty-year occupation of the State of Israel? Would he be prepared to endure more serious economic hardship?

Would he be prepared to take up arms against the occupiers?

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced yesterday that the U.S. is going to step back from a combat role in Afghanistan by mid-2013, and shift over to an "advise and assist role" instead. Assuming he means it, we'll be ending our combat role about a year before all U.S. troops are supposed to be out.

As regular readers know, I've favored a greatly reduced presence in Afghanistan for a long time, simply because I didn't think a COIN/nation-building campaign there was worth the costs, and because I don't think the outcome in Afghanistan makes much difference in the larger struggle against Al Qaeda. (In other words, I reject the "safe haven" justification for the war, largely because Al Qaeda has havens elsewhere and Afghanistan isn't an especially desirable one from their point of view).

But by a strange coincidence, we were discussing an aspect of this problem in my graduate course the very same day that Panetta made his announcement, in the context of a broader discussion on international cooperation. As some of you know, one of the basic principles of the literature on cooperation is that it is facilitated when there is a lengthy "shadow of the future." States are more likely to cooperate today if they anticipate being able to reap the benefits of cooperation far into the future; they will be leery of stiffing potential partners and foregoing that stream of long-term benefits.

What does this insight have to do with Afghanistan? Although I favor getting out as rapidly as possible, we ought to do so with the full knowledge that announcing a certain date (or even an approximate date) will reduce Afghan incentives to cooperate with us now and in the interim, and their incentive to cooperate will decline more and more as the date of withdrawal nears. Once they know that the stream of benefits is finite, they will be less willing to make adjustments or concessions to us in order to keep us in the fight. So by announcing we're leaving, Panetta was tacitly acknowledging that our leverage over the Afghan government is going to erode pretty quickly. Not that it was ever that great, of course.

Notice: This situation is different than trying to encourage greater Afghan cooperation by threatening to leave if they don't shape up, coupled with a credible promise to stay if they do. In this case, continued U.S. help would be conditional on Afghan cooperation and reform. But that's not what we're saying: Instead, we've made an essentially unconditional pledge to end our combat role (and eventually leave completely). In short: We've had enough of this war and are heading home, if not exactly briskly.

As I said, I think this is the right course of action. But actions have consequences, and we should be under no illusions about what it means for our ability to determine outcomes there. Washington still has a few cards to play (i.e., we can still empower different contenders by providing them with money, arms and training), but our long-term influence over decisions there is going to decline rapidly. But unless you're one of those people who thinks it's a good idea for Americans to try to steer the politics of an impoverished, deeply-divided Islamic country in the middle of Central Asia, this development really isn't so bad.

Sara Netanyahu (Flash 90)

Of all the qualities that are necessary for a good Israeli intelligence chief, there’s one essential one you’d never think of in a million years: don’t cross Sara Netanyahu.  You won’t find that one listed on any job description or set of requirements for the position, but in some sense it may be more important than all the other qualifications a successful candidate must have.

For a number of months, I reported that the next Shin Bet director to replace Yuval Diskin would be Yitzhak Ilan.  Yet somehow he lost out to Yoram Cohen.  I scratched my head and asked, what happened.  Israeli media was full of rumors that the top candidate lost out in the end to a dark horse through some sort of taint or blemish that sunk his candidacy.  The truth is that, in fact, until two hours before the announcement, Ilan was still the favored choice.

Ben Caspit hinted (Hebrew) that the settler movement hated Ilan (his previous intelligence jobs had involved investigating their acts of violence and extremism).  Now, it appears likely that Sara and Eshel pointed out to Bibi that he had two good candidates, but that one angered one of his core constituencies (the settlers).  So why not appoint the other and so retain their support?  From this we can also expect that Cohen will go lightly on settler acts of terror and violence.  Indeed, the fact that no one has been charged, prosecuted or imprisoned for a host of price tag attacks going back months may be ascribed to Cohen knowing on which side his bread is buttered.

In a recent conversation, a knowledgeable Israeli insider told me that Ilan ran afoul of Mrs. Netanyahu, though I never found out why.  The benefit of the Eshel sexual harassment scandal is that it’s blowing the lid off other stories.

Today’s Haaretz provides examples of the ways in which Eshel abused Rivka Kidron on the job.  One of them was to threaten her with surveillance by the Shin Bet:

One employee of the bureau [prime minister's office] who testified in the Civil Service Commission probe said that Eshel told R. he was following her every move on orders from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s wife, Sara. According to this worker’s testimony, Eshel also told R. that she only had her job because of him, and that he was the one who had convinced Sara Netanyahu to okay her employment in the bureau.

Another person who testified to the commission said Eshel had let it drop to R. that he had a role in the appointment of Shin Bet security service head Yoram Cohen, and could therefore get help from the Shin Bet to monitor her activities.

We already know of the extraordinarily close relationship between Sara and Eshel.  In fact, he was her eyes and ears in the PMO.  He did her bidding.  It now becomes obvious that one of the ways in which he did this was to promote the fortunes of the successful finalist, Cohen (who is, like Eshel, an Orthodox Jew).  What does it say about a nation’s intelligence services that to be a successful candidate you have to cultivate the favor of the prime minister’s wife as much as or more than touting your actual professional qualifications?

Returning to the Eshel-Kidron case, it’s known that Sara disapproved of the former.  This gave Eshel yet another point of leverage against the victim.  He could go to her and say that Sara hates you, I’m the only one who stands between you and a pink slip.  This is the mark of a canny sexual predator seeking pressure points to exploit for his own advantage.  It reminds me of a previously exposed high level convicted rapist, Moshe Katsav.  The only difference was that Katsav had numerous victims.  Eshel appears not to have succeeded in his blandishments toward Kidron.

Sa’da suq, May 1978; Photo by Daniel Martin Varisco